Elaine Scarry argues in The Body in Pain that war is a vast and reciprocal swearing on the body, with corporeality key not only to its brutal prosecution but also to the eventual ending of the political 'crisis of substantiation' that war entails. However, her work has not been extensively explored with reference to significant transformations in the embodied experiences of contemporary warfare. This paper thus analyses a particular articulation of late modern warfare that I term predatory war, whose current signature motif is the drone strike, through the lens of Scarry's work. Here, the associated modes of embodiment are radically non-reciprocal, the woundscapes of conflict are profoundly asymmetric, and the affective mediation of bodily injury does not substantiate any ending to the conflict. As such, I argue that the ontology and phenomenology of predatory war increasingly resembles what Scarry identifies as the underlying structure of torture.
Introduction
This paper explores how Elaine Scarry's The Body in Pain (1985) may help illuminate an understanding of the rapidly changing character of contemporary war. Scarry's work develops an analysis of the structure of war, including war's ending, that is particularly attentive to issues of bodily injury and pain. However, the explanatory value of her work has not been extensively explored with reference to significant developments in contemporary warfare, transformations that have radically reshaped the nature of injuring and significantly redrawn the contours of whose particular bodies are in pain. As such, this paper will proceed as follows. I initially explore Scarry's key arguments on war and torture in The Body in Pain, highlighting some of the limit points of her original thesis, as well as identifying further questions on the nature and ending of war that her work provokes. The paper then explores a 2 detailed case study of a particular form of contemporary warfare whose current signature motif is the drone strike and which I here name predatory war. What woundscapes, embodied subjectivities and sensory phenomenologies are being ushered in with predatory war? I examine this question through the lens of Scarry's work and its specific analytic orientation to embodied experience, exploring how this may sharpen an understanding of this emergent modality of political violence. I explore the embodied experiences of both drone operators and those subject to predatory war's intense necropolitical assay. The paper concludes by exploring the issue of predatory war's ending and by pointing to some of the opportunities that renewed engagement with Scarry's work may offer for the further analysis of contemporary transformations in war and political violence.
Bodies in Pain and the Changing Character of War
For Scarry, war is a political contest where ultimately 'what is at issue is each side's right to its own issues ' (p.88) . Crucially, and whilst often denied in the abstract and disembodied ways that war is thought and talked about in many military, strategic and media discourses, it is death, injury and pain that are manifestly at the heart of this contest over political reality.
Bodily injuring, Scarry argues, is 'the obsessive content of war ' (p.67) . This is partly because it is bodily injuring alone, as opposed to other potential surrogate idioms of conflict resolution, that carries the power of its own enforcement. However, Scarry argues that the reason for bodily injuring being the distinctive idiom for the political contestation of war, the very specific 'other means' by which war becomes a continuation of policy (Clausewitz 1976: 87) , is not only down to the opponent becoming out-injured to the point where they can no longer put up any more resistance whatsoever.
1 Rather, bodily injuring has a crucial secondary function in the political contest of war. This is that the very production of brutally wounded bodies provides a radical material base that can be enlisted into ending the reality contest and the political 'crisis of substantiation' which war entails.
Here Scarry builds upon her initial analysis in The Body in Pain of torture, whose primary feature is understood to be the infliction of pain rather than the extraction of information.
The ultimate purpose of torture is to annihilate or 'unmake' the victim's sensate world through such extreme pain, and to concomitantly assert the undeniable nature of the regime's power. Extreme pain has very particular affective attributes -an overwhelming intensity, a totalizing nature, the lack of an objective referent, a sense of undeniable reality: 'For the person in pain, so incontestably and unnegotiably present is it that "having pain" may come to be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it is to "have certainty" ' (p.4 The explanatory value of this analysis has thus not been extensively explored with reference to significant developments in twentieth and twenty-first century warfighting, including those wars characterised by significant injury to civilians, or where the blurring or placing under erasure of that particular status is a noteworthy feature of warfare itself (Kinsella 2015) . For example, an increasing reliance on 'risk-transfer' strategies in Western warfighting over the past three decades (Shaw 2005) , including the use of proxy forces and greater airpower, has meant that the risk of injury and death has often been decisively transferred away from the body of the Western solider and is increasingly borne by civilians in areas subject to bombing. The emergence of such risk-transfer warfare has also reflexively shaped insurgent and oppositional strategies leading to the 'return of the body of the patriot, the martyr and the sacrificial victim into the spectre of mass violence' (Appadurai 2006: 12) . The overall affective force of such strategies and violations will clearly be modulated through the wider circuits of public mediation with which they are designed to resonate and through which their affects will be distributed, felt and experienced. Most recently, much highly labour-intensive counterinsurgency and counterterror warfare has also increasingly been replaced by systematic rolling programmes of special forces operations and drone strikes across extended global battlespaces. (Kahn 2013: 199) As Kahn notes, the drone strike has become the signature motif of a particular contemporary mode of political violence and it is primarily these rolling programmes of targeted killing conducted under the sign of counter-terrorism by the United States JSOC and CIA across territories including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia that will be the focus of the case study of predatory war discussed here. A detailed genealogy of the drone is beyond the scope of this particular essay (see inter alia Chamayou 2015 , Gregory 2013 , Shaw 2016 . Nonetheless, its emergence represents a particular articulation of several longstanding trends and visions in warfare, and indeed the extension of logics of colonial policing and population control through airpower (Neocleous 2014) . Kindervarter (2016) argues that a combined hunter-killer capacity has long been an ambition of Western militaries, tracing the historical emergence of the drone through various attempts to both extend the scope and power of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and to collapse them with targeted killing to form a single process of 'lethal surveillance' with rapid and dynamic targeting capabilities and a compressed 'kill-chain'.
For Chamayou, since 9/11, 'a single decade has seen the establishment of an unconventional form of state violence that combines the disparate characteristics of warfare and policing without really corresponding to either, finding conceptual and practical unity in the notion of a militarised manhunt ' (2015: 32) .
On one level, such programmes of militarized manhunting thus represent a process of the individuation of warfare. As Gregory (2013) and Chamayou (2015) note, the locus of warfare has here become defined by the individual presence of the enemy-prey that is to be hunted, identified, followed and executed. The targeted killing of those deemed a threat is also crucially a quasi-juridical process, dependent upon a form of interpretative lawfare that enables violence through 'legal interpretations that harness inherent ambiguities regarding principles like imminence, proportionality, combatant status, named targeting and last resort in the contemporary security environment' (Grayson 2012: 122) . The battlespace thus becomes transformed both spatially and normatively with the potential for violence extended and the laws of war and permissible killing applied beyond the constraints of the traditional battlefield. For Gregory, such changes ultimately mean that 'the target is contracted to the individual human body even as the field of military violence expands to encompass the globe ' (2014: 14) .
However, alongside lethal surveillance that proceeds ostensibly by targeting particular named individuals -so-called 'personality strikes' -one aspect of predatory war that deserves attention is the procedure for the anticipatory selection, the performative citation, of further targets -so-called 'signature strikes' -who may never be known or identified, but rather emerge on the basis of activity rather than identity from a 'vast and continually evolving database, known as the disposition matrix' (Miller 2012) . This archive amasses information not just on certain individuals but from across the entire population in a battlespace, blanket surveillance and targeted killing going hand-in-hand. As Shaw notes, 'in order to individualise, the security state must first totalise ' (2016a: 25) . As Curtis (2016) notes, while drones may be celebrated by some as a precise and ethical form of weaponry with the ability to kill specific individuals, the whole drone apparatus of sensors, databases, algorithms and cameras actually targets the entire social environment of the population being surveilled, the 'life of the populace described as pre-insurgent' (p.7). Curtis draws upon Sloterdijk's (2009) analysis of gas warfare as a specific example of 'war by explication', that is an attack directed not against the body of the enemy per se, but against the general physical milieu that is necessary to sustain 'life-in-an-environment ' (2009: 108) .
Such an attack renders explicit an otherwise implicit background condition of existence, in the particular case of gas warfare the need for breathable space, targeting it to create an 'unliveable milieu ' (2009: 16) . Curtis argues that the drone apparatus similarly attempts to explicate and target the entire social lifeworld of myriad sayings and doings in order to reveal the patterns or even predispositions, the latent habitus, of enmity: 'The implicit aspects of the social that the drone apparatus targets are that a person speaks and acts, moves and comes together with others ... drones make this being-with explicit and problematic, if not dangerous and lethal. Like the air in our physical environment, speaking and acting together is the medium of our social environment, and yet it is this that the drone apparatus attacks ' (2016: 10) . It is thus crucial to explore not just the technical details of how the drone assemblage targets but additionally how it is thought and felt to be targeting by all those subject to its necropolitical assay, and any associated wider transformations of the social that are thus instituted by predatory war.
Embodied Experiences of Predatory War
Scarry's work alerts us to the crucial importance of thinking about embodied experience for the analysis of war and political violence. Indeed, it may be particularly apposite to attempt to supplement thinking about predatory war using her work, for a focus upon embodiment may help to take us away from the trap of thinking in technologically determinist or technofetishistic terms about drones. In particular, the very notion of precision targeted killing may misrepresent and legitimate more widespread and systematic violences inflicted upon all those living under drones, who are already some of the most vulnerable and defenceless populations on earth (Gregory 2016) . However, critical analysis of drone strikes to date has been overwhelmingly dominated by debates around their accuracy, efficacy and legality.
Tahir (2013) argues that, 'the language of international law is the only frame through which to think and speak about drone attacks'. And as Tom Gregory (2015: 197) notes, this 'emphasis on international law distracts attention away from the horrors of war by masking the pain and suffering that is caused in favor of technical debates about the application of particular legal codes. We need to turn our attention back to the embodied experiences of those affected.'
What forms of embodied subjectivities and sensory phenomenologies are ushered in then with predatory war? While testimony, reportage and scholarship is still piecemeal and uneven, lacking in particular a well-developed anthropology of the heterogeneous lived experiences of those living under drones, experiences that will inevitably be embedded within a wider matrix of multiple violences and felt insecurities (Bashir and Crews 2012) , a number of themes have begun to emerge from analysis of the lifeworlds of both drone personnel and 9 those who are subject to the 'dronification of state violence' (Shaw and Akhter 2014) . Such work is beginning to flesh out the particularly disjunctive modes of embodiment of those enrolled in predatory war, the bypassing of particular modes of intersubjectivity and intercorporeality associated with conventional war, the radically contrasting scales and types of wounds suffered, and the distinct ways in which such injuries and pains may be being experienced and made meaningful. In other words, it is beginning to map out the contrapuntal 'woundscapes' of predatory war.
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The lifeworld of the drone operator, working shifts at e.g. Creech Air Force Base in the Nevada desert, is one characterised by schizoid daily shifts and de/compressions between mundane 'peacetime' living and a very particular sense of being at work and war (Asaro 2013 ). This latter wartime 'somatic mode of attention' (Csordas 1993 ) is one characterised predominantly by periods of intense concentration and immersion in silent and monotonous visual surveillance feeds, tracing patterns of life before strikes as well as assessing their lethal aftermaths. While physically distant, drone personnel may thus feel perceptually close and indeed intimately involved with the lives, and deaths, of those that they are tasked to survey in detail and follow for days or weeks at a time. However, as Gregory (2016) notes, 'intimacy' here is something of a conceit, with surveillance being thoroughly invasive and entirely one-way.
Nonetheless, the effects of this particular military 'psychotechnology' (Kittler 1999) complicate analyses that assume the straightforward emotional and moral distancing of remote killing. From a strategic point of view, the historical affordances of destruction at a distance have not just been in overcoming the physical risks to, and the limitations of, the combatant's body in the delivery of force. They also lie in the psychological avoidance of combatants potentially experiencing unruly emotions, proto-empathic identifications with the proximate and vulnerable other, and the arousal of deep-seated inhibitions to killing in faceto-face combat (Grossman 1996) . 4 Killing-at-a-distance thus represents a way of denying, in Levinas' (1969) terms, the ethical demand of an encounter with the presence or Face of the other. 5 The ability for combatants to kill whilst increasingly physically remote, which has been progressively enhanced via developments in weaponry from firearms and artillery to aerial bombing and now drones, has thus crucially also been concomitant with their increasing detachment from the other's moral universe. As such, artillerymen and pilots have consistently reported to be less affected by the psychological agonies and guilt of killing than 10 frontline combatants (Grossman 1996) . However, this particular distance-enabled atrophying of the moral imagination is itself ruptured for drone personnel by the distinctive conjoining of extreme physical distance with intense, if unidirectional, watching in predatory war. While many psychosocial mechanisms of moral disengagement and indifference -such as euphemistic language, objectification, diffuse responsibilization -occur in the overall perpetration of drone strikes (Bandura 2017) , and the visual feeds watched by drone personnel are themselves often ghostly and pointillist rather than distinct, the potential for drone personnel to experience ambivalence, projection, guilt and haunting is nonetheless heightened by this peculiarly invasive voyeurism and ruinous following unto death of the lives of others.
Indeed, testimonies from former drone operators and sensors have specifically attested to how particular images of the surveilled and killed return to haunt them as traumatically recurring visual memories, 'like a small video, embedded in your head, forever on repeat, causing psychological pain and suffering that most people will hopefully never experience' (Linebaugh 2013) . This is former drone operator Brandon Bryant: 'I felt like I was haunted by a legion of the dead … I was in so much pain I was ready to eat a bullet myself' (cited in While it is clearly important to recognize all the various dimensions of suffering involved in predatory war, and further to complicate any simplistic narratives of its disembodied prosecution (Edney-Browne 2017), this is not to suggest that there is any equivalence, moral or otherwise, in the overall woundscapes of predatory war, as will be discussed further below.
Indeed, in a wider discussion of how changing clinical conceptions of trauma in recent decades include an emerging acceptance that trauma may be screen-mediated as well as directly experienced, Pinchevski (2015) cautions that such a cultural shift towards consideration of the plight of the observer of remote pain may work on occasion to occlude the very conditions under which such 'images' may come to assume their traumatic impacts in the first place. 6 In terms of the non-visual sensory phenomenology of predatory war, it is also important to note here that the drone operator currently hears nothing from that which is rendered on screen, aural communication and familiarity existing only with other analysts, or with associated troops on the ground if operating in support mode, and important social and emotional intimacies established along related lines (Gregory 2013 , Hussain 2013 interviews with 69 residents of Waziristan, the vast majority male, whose communities were subject to prolonged lethal surveillance (any names repeated below are anonymized).
The sound of drones functions directly as a form of 'thanatosonic' (Daughtry 2015) paranoia, inducing widespread feelings of predation, anxiety and ontological insecurity that at any given moment death might be instantaneously dealt from above. This is an immersive sonic and affective experience of unavoidable dread and helplessness, distinct from other wartime sounds such as the air raid siren that may trigger flight for shelter, or even the whistle of approaching shellfire, where skilled directional acoustemology may enable the possibility, however slight, of increasing one's knowledge of the attack and hence chances of survival.
One interviewee described the reaction to the sound of the drones as "a wave of terror" coming over the community (LUD p.81). Many others testified to the way that the sonic presence of drones penetrates and disrupts the physical space and emotional security of the home, like being "in a room with a bee buzzing inside", so that it becomes impossible to sleep or rest properly: "I can't sleep at night because . . . I hear them making that sound, that noise. The drones are all over my brain, I can't sleep. When I hear the drones making that drone sound, I just turn on the light and sit there looking at the light" (LUD p.84).
The unpredictability of attacks, and incomprehension as to why people were targeted, was a common theme in respondents' accounts. One interviewee stated, "God knows whether they'll strike us again or not. But they're always surveying us, they're always over us, and you never know when they're going to strike" (LUD p.95). A sense of uncontrollability and helplessness to minimize exposure to drone strikes compounded this psychological distress:
"We are scared. We are worried. The worst thing is that we cannot find a way to do anything about it. We feel helpless" (LUD p. was not just large public gatherings that were affected. Another respondent testified that, "after the drones, people can't go and talk with or sit with anybody at any time. And so they face great difficulty carrying on their business and their families" (LUD p.96). Many said that they were afraid to congregate in groups or receive guests in their home. Umar Ashraf testified that, "more than two can't sit together outside because they are scared they might be 13 struck by drones" (LUD p.96). Such pervasive incertitude was also the breeding ground for rumours and myths that further undermined community trust -for example, that certain people were planting chips on others that attracted the drones (LUD p.113). The atmosphere was thus one of ubiquitous threat and torturous uncertainty, where everyday social interactions were felt to be newly precarious as they might potentially attract the drones, and
where there was an absence of any clear idea of what to do and how to act in order to be safe.
Furthermore, the widespread undermining of any sense of ontological security was particularly exacerbated as even the domestic home, traditionally a space of human flourishing and emotional refuge against the outside world, has been a focal point for attacks in Waziristan. Beyond the general violation of a sense of private sanctuary, this systematic targeting of the domestic home inflicts profound disturbances to the specific local social order. This is both because the family home has a sacred place in the Islamic faith (Grayson 2016 ) and in particular because it is a key site for significant Pashtunwali ('way of the Pashtuns') cultural obligations and social norms such as melmastia, the duty to provide hospitality to guests, and nanawati, that one may be granted asylum and be protected from enemies upon entering the security of a home (LUD p.36). With even the domestic home, the very space of hospitality and protection, becoming newly perilous then, the effects of 'precision' targeting for those on the ground have ironically encompassed a profound broadening of the sense of predation, an undermining of any sense of there being spaces where one might reliably find safety from hostility. Rather predatory war has been experienced in terms of widespread feelings of ubiquitous surveillance, of enclosure and being held hostage, and the increasing penetration, desecration and inversion of a sense of hospitality and safety everywhere and at all times. Ismail Hussain, an inhabitant of Datta Khel, which was hit by drones more than three dozen times in three years, spoke of how a number of individuals, "have lost their mental balance … are just locked in a room. Just like you lock people in prison, they are locked in a room" (LUD p.88). Faisal bin Ali Jabair, whose brother and nephew died in a drone strike in Yemen, summarized his experience as follows: "They are experimenting on us, on our blood and on our land" (Ackerman 2016).
As Scarry notes, a radical contraction and inversion of everything that is traditionally experienced as safe and benign is the very phenomenology and methodology of torture, the unmaking of the victim's world. As everyday sayings and doings, moving and being-with others are targeted by the drone apparatus, the entire social environment is here unmade and 14 weaponized to become part of a torture apparatus, 'the appropriation of the world into the torturer's arsenal of weapons ' (1985: 45 The End of the Idea of Ending If, as Scarry argues, the ideational crisis of substantiation that war entails is ultimately sutured through the materiality of wounded and broken bodies, it is important to consider if and how these radically disjunctive embodied experiences of predatory war, and their wider affective mediation, may potentially be constituting or prefiguring such a regime of transubstantiative meaning-making and gesturing towards an ending to the conflict. While, as noted earlier, Scarry's work is only ever suggestive in theorizing how a widespread regime of transubstantiation may take hold and compel, I argue that it is difficult in this particular case to glimpse any intimation of a potentially concluding regime of transubstantiation taking shape, any sense that the bodily pain being produced is somehow being lent towards an 15 ending of predatory war. Rather, certain bodily injuries are being made to matter through their enrolment into narratives that legitimate the continuing prosecution of predatory war.
For example, recent mediation of predatory war in Western film, drama and reportage has predominantly focussed upon the domestic experiences of the drone operator (Stahl 2013 , Brady 2015 . Even when such cultural texts may attempt to question the broader ethics of predatory war, the narrative conduit for such exploration has primarily been the emotional difficulties and 'moral injury' that individual operators themselves may suffer on the basis of their participation in the infliction of pain upon others. Such a narrative framing inevitably tends to disavow analysis of any wider political context to war (Scranton 2016) , making no sustained attempt to explore or contextualise this distress within the overall distribution and moral economy of violence and wider suffering in predatory war. Indeed, this attempt to locate and narrate meaning and morality predominantly via the 'personal code' (Shapiro 1988 ) of drone operators' individual stories functions primarily in terms of the semiotics and affects of sacrifice. Whilst permitting the expression of some moral ambivalence, it nonetheless crucially attributes a sense of embodied sacrifice to a war that otherwise can appear increasingly processual and troublingly post-sacrificial (see also Baggiarini 2015) .
This framing thus provides for the audience a possible channelling of meaning, of affective grip, to a conflict that is inherently shadowy and otherwise lacks any recognisable cultural shape and emotional resonance. In assuming this particular form, it has significant continuity with what McSorley (2012) argues was the dominant mediated regime of sensation through which recent counterinsurgency warfare has been made palpable to wider Western audiences, which relatedly focused on the vulnerable body of the soldier, ultimately as an attempt to reenchant a war that otherwise had come to be felt as meaningless, its war aims unclear and its morality ambiguous. Further, as Scarry notes, a highlighting of the perpetrator's difficulty in witnessing whilst doing their 'duty' has long been part of the structure and denial of torture:
'it prevents the mind from ever getting to the place where it would have to make comparisons. Power is cautious. It covers itself. It bases itself in another's pain and prevents all recognition that there is 'another' by looped circles that ensure its own solipsism' There is thus no intimation here of the collective substantiation of an eventual ending of predatory war, only a continued separation of lifeworlds, injuries and deaths. The affective mediation of bodily violation is not being lent towards any sense of the resolution of a political contest, and hence is not potentially contributing to the lessening or modulation of violence away from its continuation in a processual, sustainable, and increasingly postpolitical mode. Indeed, continuing a trend of many recent conflicts, the very nature of the crisis of substantiation is itself increasingly opaque in predatory war. That many labourintensive ground wars are now undertaken with a key initial war aim being the instantiation of a viable 'exit strategy' captures a particular confusion of means and ends, and an uncertainty as to the nature of the political contest and objectives, at the heart of much late modern war, particularly that conducted within a world-purifying imaginative structure under the nebulous sign of counterterror (Kahn 2013) . It is this confusion that the emergence of predatory war itself attempts to manage, being practised as a particular risk-averse mode of managing a crisis that is nonetheless imagined as perpetual, predicated upon the containment rather than the possible resolution of an antagonism that is ultimately understood to be existential and beyond the political. As Lifton (2003) notes, "The war on terror is apocalyptic, then, exactly because it is militarized and yet amorphous, without limits of time or place, and has no clear end. It therefore enters the realm of the infinite. Implied in its approach is that every last terrorist everywhere on earth is to be hunted down until there are no more anywhere to threaten us, and in that way the world will be rid of evil."
Predatory war thus comes with a temporal imagination of conflict that is at least generational if not infinite, and a concomitant sense that the possibility of ending has increasingly disappeared. It is not just that a particular ending to predatory war appears distant, but that the very idea of ending itself recedes as a possible horizon. If an ending to war can no longer even be imagined or defined -'made up' in Scarry's terms -it is even more unclear how it might it ever be 'made real', become substantiated through the materiality of corporeal injury. As explored in the opening section of this paper, Scarry notes that war and torture have a related underlying structure in terms of the translation and appropriation of the attributes of bodily pain and injury into political power. However, there are also clear differences in that the distribution of pain, injury and 'bodily consent' between those involved is radically asymmetric in the paradigmatic staging of a torture that is world-destroying for the tortured and serves to materialise the fiction of political power for the torturer (of course there are also differences in the way that the situations of war and torture are ultimately morally evaluated).
One way to read Scarry's work then is not to emphasise war and torture as ontologically separate situations, a reading that may at times be suggested by the ideal types that she principally discusses in The Body in Pain 10 , but rather as framing events in a continuum of political violence, a continuum of the unmaking and remaking of the world, along the axis of reciprocity. Here the underlying mechanism of the transubstantiation of pain and injury into political power is consistent, but the types of injuries, embodiments and pains that are enrolled into various processes of political mattering differ.
It is also important to state that although the structure of war traditionally depends upon the mutual willingness of each side to kill and be killed, as Kahn notes 'this ethos of reciprocal sacrifice always stands in tension with the tactics of warfare. Tactically, each side seeks to transcend any effective reciprocity in the application of force ' (2013: 219 I argue that re-consideration of this original analysis allows a sharpened appreciation of the ways in which predatory war crucially differs from such a formulation. As discussed the nature of the particular political antagonism in predatory war is unclear, with nebulous war aims that encompass the countering of perpetual existential threat whilst eliminating any risk or vulnerability on one's own side; the associated modes of embodiment are non-reciprocal and the woundscapes and maps of pain are radically asymmetric; and the affective mediation of such bodily pain more closely resembles a regime of disappearance than of any collective transubstantiation that might prefigure an ending. Scarry notes that, 'Every weapon has two ends. In converting the other person's pain into his own power, the torturer experiences the entire occurrence from the invulnerable end of the weapon ' (1985: 59 'the referential instability of the hurt body' (p.121) means that bodies and wounds from both original sides will ultimately collectively substantiate the winning idea, and the disappearance of the losing one, as the overall cost of, e.g. union or freedom, whatever their initial referential status. However, exactly how a widespread regime of transubstantiative meaning-making might ultimately take hold remains slightly unclear. 3 Terry defines woundscapes as "territories marked by injuries to bodies that index particular moments in the wounding capacity of technologies" (2009: 203). 4 As numerous humanist accounts of wartime experiences emphasize, it is when corporeal or visual co-presence occurs that the boundaries of enmity and friendship may blur, and an alternative empathetic recognition of humanity, often rooted in bodily frailty and mutual vulnerability, may emerge. Embodied experience thus always risks the contingency of unforeseen shared sensory and affective experiences that may undermine the binary oppositions that war sets up (Cole 2009). 5 It is important to note that Levinas' philosophical concept of the face does not directly correspond to physical countenance, but rather he states that "the way in which the Other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we name here face" (Levinas 1969: 50) . Indeed, his work can be read as a reflection upon how ethics is itself underpinned by acts of mediation, a proposal that has been specifically explored with reference to textual and screen mediation (see e.g. Silverstone 2007 , Pinchevski 2014 . 6 The science of psychic injury and associated psychological rather than physical conceptions of trauma (originally Greek for 'wound') has, since the 19 th century, developed in tandem with various shifts in technology and warfare, from 'shell shock' following WW1 to 'PTSD' post-Vietnam. Pinchevski (2015) further argues that conceptions of psychic trauma have also long assumed an 20 underlying 'media logic', from Freud's idea of repetition compulsion to the centrality of the traumatic afterimage in contemporary PTSD conceptualization, a logic that is further elaborated in reading screen mediation itself as a potential locus of trauma. 7 Scarry thus notes that in much torture, 'the world is reduced to a room or a set of rooms ... the torture room is not just the setting in which the torture occurs ... it is itself literally converted into another weapon, into an agent of pain ... the room is undone, made to participate in the annihilation of the prisoners ' (1985: p.40-41) 8 In the accounting of those actually killed by drone strikes, US policy until early 2013 classified all 'military-aged male' casualties in the vicinity of a target as being enemy combatants. Here the dead body is proof of guilt and legitimates the strike. As Scarry notes, "In its basic outlines, torture is the inversion of the trial. While the one studies evidence that may lead to punishment, the other uses punishment to generate the evidence" (1985: 41).
9 Holmqvist (2014: 37) relatedly argues that, "war is becoming perpetual and endless quite simply because the liberal world is unable to imagine conclusive endings to the wars it is currently fighting". 10 Although it is important to note that Scarry herself argues that if the widespread distribution of 'bodily consent' for war becomes radically curtailed, e.g. in a political community that develops the ability to deploy 'out-of-ratio' nuclear weapons, then the resultant structure of nuclear war may also approach the structure and phenomenology of torture (1985: 151-157 ; see also Scarry 2014).
11 Although clearly relevant, there is not scope in this essay to explore the wider re-normalization of torture that has accompanied the war on terror, a phenomenon that itself needs to be understood in terms of a continuum of racialized anxiety in the American imagination that has long understood and inscribed particular bodies as torturable (see e.g. Hajjar 2013 , Richter-Montpetit 2014 .
